Every abstract type of a belief-closed type space corresponds to an infinite belief hierarchy. But only finite order of beliefs is necessary for most applications.
Introduction
In most Bayesian game applications, information incompleteness is typically captured by a naive prior for simplicity, where each type of a player is identified with his privately informed payoff type who then forms his posterior belief by updating the prior. Despite its virtue of simplicity, naive type spaces may be too restrictive for certain applications.
For example, consider a sealed-bid, first-price auction of a high-tech patent between two potential buyers. In addition to the uncertainty about each other's reservation prices, one bidder might have reason to suspect that the other bidder may be able to acquire information about his reservation price with some positive probability, say, by hiring a super-talented computer hacker to steal his sensitive information. Naive type spaces cannot deal with such information settings.
Indeed, several recent studies show that deviations from naive type spaces may lead to qualitatively different conclusions in well-known models (see for example, Neeman 2004, Feinberg and Skrzypacz, 2005) . There is, however, a great deal of additional complexity attached to type spaces beyond the naive ones. Though they may look simple in the implicit model a la Harsanyi (1967) , without further classification, their correspondences in the Mertens and Zamir's (1985) explicit model of universal belief hierarchies can be too involved for intuitive comprehension. Furthermore, given a game of incomplete information, neither the implicit nor the explicit model specifies the maximum order of interactive beliefs that are strategically relevant. As we discuss later, however, characterizing type spaces in terms of belief orders that are strategically relevant turns out to be crucial in many applications, such as in the analysis of robustness of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE).
In this paper, we show that the notions of a "consistent finite-order prior" and its "canonical type space" help to explicitly model type spaces with finite-order belief hierarchies, to establish a simple criterion for determining the order of an abstract belief-closed type space, and to analyze robustness of BNEs, among other issues.
We begin with the order-2 case. In the simplest version of an order-2 consistent prior, for each player nature draws according to the prior a payoff type and a firstorder belief about the others' payoff types. Unlike with naive types, nature may draw multiple beliefs for a player's payoff type. The consistency of the prior requires that for each player, all his beliefs drawn by nature coincide with the posterior he can obtain by updating the prior from his private information.
We show that the set of consistent order-2 priors is convex, and it includes all naive type spaces. The complete-information type spaces turn out to be special cases of consistent order-2 priors. Consequently, type spaces with consistent order-2 common priors consist of the smallest class for robustness analysis of complete information games. Since this class contains the convex hull of the naive and the complete information type spaces, there is sufficient richness in structure to allow for new and often diametrical results in contrast to games with either naive or complete information type spaces. We defer further discussions to sections 1.1 and 4.
Models with heterogeneous priors suffer the disadvantage for not being explicit about nature's move to generate the interim private information, which is possible only with a common prior. For this reason, heterogeneous priors are often criticized for being too ad hoc, making trivial the explanation for how information differences result in behavior differences. As Myerson (2004) argues, there are strong modeling methodological reasons why the consistent common-prior assumption (CPA) has become standard in economic analysis. However, heterogeneous beliefs without support of an explicit common prior are often encountered in applications. 1 We show that with two players, heterogeneous naive priors with a common support can always be embedded in a consistent order-2 prior, in the sense that any posterior belief a player obtains by updating his naive prior can be obtained by updating the (embedding) consistent order-2 prior from his private information. For the n-player case, we characterize a suf-ficient condition for players' naive heterogeneous priors to be embedded in an order-2 consistent prior. This result reconciles the CPA controversy to the extent that players' heterogeneous priors could be "justified" by their induced posteriors being simultaneously generated from a common prior of exactly one-order higher. It could be imagined as if nature made its move according to the higher-order common prior, but systematically failed to inform, as private information, certain realizations. With this failure being common knowledge, the resulting information structure behaves as if every player is supposed to simply update his own heterogeneous prior to get the appropriate posteriors.
The model of private-value order-2 consistent-priors generalizes to models of privateor common-value consistent priors of arbitrary finite orders: An order-k consistent prior jointly draws a payoff-relevant parameter profile and a coherent belief hierarchy of order (k − 1) for each player, which matches the player's order-(k-1) belief hierarchy generated from updating the common prior using private information. Re-interpret such order-(k-1) belief hierarchies in the support of the prior as abstract types, the prior then induces a canonical common-prior belief-closed type space, such that the order-(k-1) projection of the associated universal belief hierarchies coincide with those of the abstract types. Private-value consistent finite-order priors are special common-value consistent finite-order priors, with additional information on private values.
We define a common-prior belief-closed type space to be of order-k if it can be mapped by some type morphism into a canonical representation of an order-k consistent prior. We show that a belief-closed type space is of order-k if and only if any two types of each player must be either identical, implying one of them is redundant, or separable by their order-(k-1) belief hierarchies. In this sense, an order-k consistent prior is equivalent to an order-k type space with a common prior. For this reason, we use consistent prior and common-prior type space interchangeably.
We consider several applications of our model of order-k consistent priors or order-k common-prior belief-closed type spaces. First, we consider "finite-order projections" of an arbitrary belief-closed type space. Such projections can be interpreted as bounded rational realizations of the original type space. With these projections, Weinstein and Yildiz's (2007b) global stability under uncertainty condition can be applied to ensure the convergence of the BNEs of the projection type spaces to those of the original type space. Second, we introduce an "order-k total-variation norm" for priors as an alternative to the standard product weak topology. Given any finite integer k, within the space of all order-k common-prior type spaces, the product topology is equivalent to both strategic topology (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006) and uniform weak topology (Chen et al, 2009 ). Applying the order-k total variation norm, we extend Kajii and Morris (1997) notion of robustness to general incomplete information games. We show that all BNEs of a Bayesian game with an order-k type space are "strong-k robust" against "order-k perturbations". This result extends the robustness result by Monderer and Samet (1989) for Nash equilibria of complete information games.
Literature Review of Order-2 Bayesian Games
Popular in applications of Bayesian games are the identification of the players' types with their payoff types and the assumption that it is common knowledge among the players that their types are jointly drawn by nature according to a common prior. These have an extreme implication: if a player's payoff is known, then so is his belief about the other players' types.
In recent literature, we have witnessed two strands of work that used information structure beyond the naive type spaces to arrive at some refreshing and striking results. One strand starts with allowing one payoff type to have more than one first-order beliefs, which results in less efficient outcomes. Indeed, Neeman (2004) demonstrates that the well-known full-surplus-extraction (FSE) results in mechanism design literature crucially hinge on the property that the agents' beliefs uniquely determine their payoff types (the BDP property). By implicitly constructing an order-2 consistent prior that easily violates the BDP property, he shows that FSE is not valid. Moreover, Heifetz and Neeman (2006) show that BDP is non-generic in general type spaces, in contrast to the claim in Cremer and McClean (1985, 1988 ) that BDP, and hence FSE, is generic in the class of naive type spaces. 2 Bergemann and Valimaki (2008, section 3.2) has an example that demonstrates the strategic implication of introducing non-naive order-2 priors into First-Price Auction. Once again, allowing a payoff type to have two different order-1 beliefs leads to altered bidding strategies so that the outcome in the first-price auction is no longer efficient, and revenue equivalence to the Second-Price Auction is not valid. Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) show that the Coase conjecture fails and delay occurs 2 Given a convex family of priors containing at least one non-BDP prior, Heifetz and Neeman (2006) show that the subset of BDP priors is contained in a proper face of and finitely shy in the convex family of priors. Thus, the subset of BDP priors is small in both geometric and measure-theoretic senses. In relation to our discussion of Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) , we will see that it is quite common that the same property is generic at the lower order space but is non-generic at the higher order ones.
with positive probability in bilateral trading, once the underlying information structure allows for uncertainty about seller's first-order beliefs and there is positive probability that the seller has a certainty belief. We demonstrate in details later in this paper that their prior turns out to be the convex combination of two naive ones; hence, it is a consistent order-2 prior. As an implication of the convexity of consistent priors and the insights from Heifetz and Neeman (2006) , we confirm their conjecture that the failure of Coase conjecture is generic within the class of order-2 priors.
The other strand of the new literature is aimed at robustness of solutions around the condition of complete information. Bergemann and Morris (2005) show that, under some conditions, a social choice function being Bayesian implementable for all naive and complete information type spaces implies its implementability for all universal type spaces. The latter is equivalent to ex post implementability. As complete-information type spaces turn out to be order-2 consistent priors, their proof implies that for robust implementation, it is sufficient to have Bayesian implementability on order-2 consistent priors.
In a common-value environment, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) introduce a class of perturbations of the complete information to argue in favor of risk dominance in equilibrium selection. Morris and Shin (2000) modify their model with additional source of uncertainty in the form of a public signal and argued that rationalizability can be perturbation-specific. 3 As we argue in Section 4, the perturbed type spaces in these papers are all of order-2. It is also interesting to notice that Chung and Ely (2003) apply order-2 perturbations of a complete-information type space in their proof of the necessity of the monotonicity for undominated Nash equilibrium-closure implementability.
Another critical issue currently discussed in Ely and Peski (2006) and Liu (2009) concerns strategic relevance of redundancy in belief-closed type spaces. We show that our framework can be formally extended to modeling strategic redundancy using additional signal spaces as equilibrium correlation devices. In other words, even though our initial model has the feature of being free of redundancy, this feature can be easily bypassed to allow for richer strategic environment based on the essential principle of finite-order spaces.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of consistent order-2 priors for a private-value payoff environment and discuss its properties. Complete-information type spaces are shown to belong to this class. We also extend the definition to common-value environments. In Section 3, we extend our notion to general consistent finite-order priors, link them with finite-order universal type spaces, and extend results in Section 2. Moreover, we define projections of type spaces and finite-order total variation norms of priors. We apply them to the analysis of robustness of BNEs. In Section 4, we apply our framework of finite-order consistent priors to problems analyzed in the recent literature. Section 5 concludes.
Order-Consistent Priors
We adopt the following notation in what follows. Given a subset C of a topological space, ∆(C) denotes the set of probability measures on the σ-algebra of Borel sets of C. Given P ∈ ∆(C), suppP denotes the support of P . Given an element a ∈ C, δ a denotes the indicator function of the set {a}. For C = X × Y , we use P X or marg X P to denote the marginal probability measure of P ∈ ∆(C) over X and B X or proj X B the projection of B onto X for B ⊆ C.
A game with incomplete information is a collection Γ = {(A i , u i , T i , π i ) i∈N , Θ}, where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the player set, Θ is the space of payoff-relevant parameters, and for each i ∈ N , A i is the action set of player i, u i : A×Θ −→ his payoff function, T i his type set, and π i : T i −→ ∆(Θ × T −i ) is his belief function. Given t i ∈ T i , π i (t i ) specifies player i's belief about the others' types t −i ∈ T −i and the payoff-relevant parameter θ ∈ Θ. A probability measure P ∈ ∆(Θ × T ) is a common prior for Γ if π i (t i ) = P (·|t i ) for all t i ∈ T i and for all i ∈ N . With a common prior, the timing of the game can be perceived as nature moving first to generate all relevant information at the beginning. For technical tractability, we focus on priors with finite support for our theoretical analysis throughout the paper.
A strategy for player i in game Γ is a mapping σ i :
where the expectation is taken with respect to π i (t i ) on both sides.
The collection T = {Θ, (T i , π i ) ∈N } is the belief-closed type space based on payoff environment Θ for game Γ. It is finite if each T i is finite; it has full support if
for all i and all t ∈ T . For each player i ∈ N , each of his type t i ∈ T i can be associated with an infinite belief hierarchy as in Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) , which explicitly describes his belief about payoff-relevant parameters in Θ, his belief about the others' beliefs about elements in Θ, and so on. In this paper, we analyze conditions on a belief-closed type space T under which only beliefs up to some finite order are strategically relevant. We study special features of such belief-closed type spaces. Since most applications of Bayesian games (e.g. in auction and mechanism design literature) involve private values of the players, we begin our analysis with the private-value case and then extend the analysis to the common-value case.
The Private Value Case

Consistency and Convexity
Assume Θ = i∈N Θ i , where Θ i is a finite set of payoff-relevant parameter values for each player i ∈ N . Elements in Θ i are payoff-relevant parameter values and are called payoff types of player i. A posterior belief of player i about other players' payoff types is a probability measure on Θ −i = Π j =i Θ j . Such a belief is known as player i's first-order or order-1 belief. Now imagine that nature first draws a profile (θ, φ) ∈ Θ × Π i∈N ∆(Θ −i ) according to a prior F ∈ ∆(Θ × Π i∈N ∆(Θ −i )) and then informs each player i of both his payoff type θ i and order-1 belief φ i . Since player i can use F in combination with his private information (θ i , φ i ) to derive a posterior belief about θ −i via Bayes rule, this derived posterior belief must coincide with φ i to avoid any contradiction for considering the latter as his belief.
The following proposition establishes the convexity of the class of consistent order-2 priors. The convexity of the space of consistent order-2 priors is an important property. For example, it enables us to show that two players' heterogenous priors can always be embedded in a consistent order-2 prior.
Proposition 1 Any convex combination of two consistent order-2 priors is again a consistent order-2 prior.
Proof. Let F and F be any two consistent order-2 priors (i.e., in ∆(Θ×Π n i=1 ∆(Θ −i ))) and let λ be any weight in (0, 1). Then, F = λF + (1 − λ)F is an order-2 prior and suppF = suppF ∪ suppF .
Fix player i and consider
Applying the fact of
Note that a convex combination of two priors can be interpreted as a result of random choice by nature. As Example 1 below illustrates, richer information structures can be generated by having nature randomly select among simpler ones.
Example 1: Think of a bilateral trading game with an indivisible good between a buyer (player 1) and a seller (player 2). Assume the buyer's reservation value is either high or low, denoted θ 1h and θ 1l , while the seller has a single reservation value θ 2 . Assume further there are two possible naive priors P A , P B ∈ ∆(Θ) with Θ = {(θ 1h , θ 2 ), (θ 1l , θ 2 )}, due to different product origins, say place A and place B, initially unknown. It is commonly known that the probability for A (resp. B) being the true origin is λ (resp. 1 − λ). 
where By Proposition 1,
. It has the following explicit form:
otherwise.
It follows that random drawing by nature according to F λ would yield the information structure in this example. Thus, F λ can be used as the common prior to model the information structure. Note that F λ is not naive because the same payoff type θ 2 of the seller is now associated with two different first-order beliefs φ A 2 and φ B 2 . Thus, interpreting a convex combination as nature's move to choose among naive priors enriches the information structure by one belief order higher. It turns out, as we discuss in section 4, that Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) exploited an information structure that can be generated by having F λ for a suitable choice of λ as the common prior in their reconsideration of the Coase conjecture with higher-order uncertainty.
Embedding Naive Priors
We are interested in embedding players' naive heterogenous priors in a consistent order-2 common prior.
Definition 2
We say that a profile P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) of individual naive priors in ∆(Θ) can be embedded in a consistent order-2 prior F if for all θ ∈ Θ such that
Definition 2 requires that players' posterior beliefs determined by their naive priors be jointly drawn with positive probability by a consistent order-2 prior. Notice that the support of the common prior may contain elements that are not possible under the given heterogeneous priors. Consequently, the embedding common prior may add beliefs not relevant in the original heterogeneous type space. 4 Notice also that (2) implies that the individual naive priors must have the same support.
We now show that with n = 2, the players' naive heterogenous priors can always be embedded in a consistent order-2 nature, provided they have a common support.
Proposition 2 Suppose n = 2. Then, the players' naive priors can always be embedded in an order-2 prior whenever they have a common support.
Proof. Let P 1 and P 2 be the naive priors for player 1 and player 2 such that suppP 1 = suppP 2 . For eachθ ∈ suppP i , let Pθ ∈ ∆(Θ) be a prior given by
It is clear that Pθ is well-defined and θ 1 and θ 2 are independently distributed under
which does not vary with θ i . By construction,
Thus, putting this together with (3), every θ ∈ suppPθ results in the same order-1 beliefs P 1 (·|θ 1 ) for player 1 and P 2 (·|θ 2 ) for player 2. It follows that
defines a probability measure on the algebra of Borel sets K ×Φ of the cartesian product
. By the Extension Theorem (see Theorem 3.1 in Billingsley 1995), Fθ can be extended to a unique probability measure on the σ-algebra generated by Borel
. We use Fθ itself to denote the extension. By (3) and (4), Fθ is consistent and suppFθ = suppP i ∪ {P (·|θ)}.
Now choose αθ > 0 forθ ∈ suppP i such that θ ∈suppP i αθ = 1. Set
Furthermore, for allθ ∈ suppP i , since suppP 1 = suppP 2 and suppFθ ⊆ suppF , it follows from (5) that (θ, Pθ(·|θ)) ∈ suppF . This shows that F also satisfies (2).
The following proposition provides a generalization of Proposition 2 to the n-person case.
Proposition 3 Let P = (P 1 , · · · , P n ) be a profile of personalized naive priors in ∆(Θ).
Suppose (i) suppP 1 = · · · = suppP n and (ii) for allθ ∈ suppP 1 , there exists Qθ ∈ ∆(Θ) such that for all θ ∈ suppP 1 and i = j,
Then, P = (P 1 , · · · , P n ) can be embedded in an order-2 consistent prior.
Proof. Fixθ ∈ ∆ and define Pθ ∈ ∆(Θ) by
By conditions (i) and (ii), Pθ is well-defined (i.e., belonging to ∆(Θ) and independent of i ∈ N ). Notice Pθ(θ i ) = Qθ(θ i ) for all θ i ∈ Θ i and for all i. Hence,
The rest of the proof repeats the proof of Proposition 2.
Notice that condition (ii) is automatic when n = 2. In that case, we can simply take Qθ(θ) = P 1 (θ 2 |θ 1 )P 2 (θ 1 |θ 2 ) for allθ, θ ∈ suppP 1 . Notice also that condition (ii) implies that any two different players have the same belief about a third player's individual payoff types. That is, P j (θ i |θ j ) = P k (θ i |θ k ), for all θ,θ ∈ Θ and three different players i, j, k. This is a strong condition. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for P to be embedded in an order-2 consistent prior in an appendix to this paper.
Complete Information as Consistent Order-2 Priors
Games of complete information are often benchmarks for modeling economic problems. For example, Bergemann and Morris (2005) show that a class of social choice functions is ex post implementable if they are Bayesian-Nash implementable for all completeinformation type spaces. Therefore, it is important to properly sort them out within the universal type space. Intuitively, players have complete information aboutθ ∈ Θ if every player i believes with probability 1 that the others' payoff types are as inθ −i .
and givenθ ∈ Θ, we say that information about payoff-type profileθ is complete if
for all i and for all φ such that (θ, φ) ∈ suppF ; we say that information is complete or F is a complete-information prior if the above condition holds for allθ ∈ suppF .
Observe that the definition implies that F is consistent whenever F is a completeinformation prior. To explore further special properties, let Fθ be the order-2 prior defined by
Then, Fθ is consistent and (θ, φ) ∈ suppFθ if and only if θ =θ and φ = (
. That is, the one-point prior Fθ in (6) is a complete-information prior. Furthermore, we have
Thus, from (6),
This shows that F is in the convex hull of {Fθ}θ ∈Θ .
Conversely, given two complete-information order-2 priors F , F and given a number α ∈ [0, 1], it follows from Proposition 1 that the convex combination F = αF + (1 − α)F is consistent. Since suppF = suppF ∪ suppF , (θ,φ) ∈ suppF implies (θ,φ) ∈ suppF or (θ,φ) ∈ suppF . In either case, since F and F are both complete-information priors,φ = (δθ −i ) n i=1 . Hence, F is also a complete-information prior. This shows that priors in the convex hull of {Fθ}θ ∈Θ are all complete-information priors.
Proposition 4 shows in particular that complete-information priors form a convex subspace of the space of consistent order-2 priors. We show in the next section that a consistent order-2 prior corresponds to an order-2 universal type sub-space.
The Common Value Case
Let Θ be the space of payoff-relevant parameter values not necessarily decomposable into individual elements. In this case, the information setting is such that nature first draws a belief in ∆(Θ) for each player and an element in Θ according to a prior F ∈ ∆(Θ × Π n i=1 ∆(Θ)). Then, player i is informed of his order-1 belief over Θ. Unlike the private-value case, no part of θ is directly revealed to him as part of private information. Thus, prior F is consistent if for all (θ, φ) ∈ suppF ,
With (7) replacing (1), a parallel extension of our previous analysis and results can be naturally made. In particular, any common-value complete information type space can be written as an order-2 consistent prior F such that (θ, φ) ∈ suppF if and only if φ i = δ θ for all i.
A private-value prior can be viewed as a special form of common-value prior. To see
) is a consistent common-value order-2 prior with the additional information on private values. It is clear that F and F yield the same information structure. Unless needed, our subsequent discussion will focus on the common-value case.
3 Finite-Order Belief Hierarchies, Priors, and Type
Spaces
In this section we extend results in section 2 to belief hierarchies of finite order k − 1 for any arbitrary integer k ≥ 2. A consistent prior on players' belief hierarchies of order k − 1 is naturally of order k. When viewing such an order k consistent prior as specifying an abstract belief-closed type space, an order-k "canonical" type space is induced which has the same order-(k-1) belief hierarchies for each player.
An abstract belief-closed type space is of order k if it has a type morphism with the canonical type space of some consistent order-k prior. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for an abstract belief-closed type space to be of order k.
By truncating the belief hierarchies of a type space at a certain finite order, a finiteorder projection of a type space is obtained. We introduce an order-k total variation norm to the projection priors to refine a notion of robustness of solutions. We fix Θ as the given common-value payoff environment throughout the rest of this section.
Order-(k-1) Belief Hierarchies and Order-k Priors
Let k ≥ 2 be an integer. For each player i, the following recursive construction of the spaces of belief hierarchies of orders h = 1, · · · , k − 1 is standard:
) and refer to it as an (k-1)-belief hierarchy of player i. As usual, t
Set
priors. The next definition extends our notion of consistency to order-k priors.
) is coherent and
Notice that the consistency (10) of F together with the coherency (9) of t
F implies consistency at lower orders. That is,
By sorting terms carefully, a direct application of Proposition 1 establishes the next result.
Corollary 1 Consistent order-k priors consist of a convex subspace of ∆(Θ × T k−1 ).
Order-(k-1) Belief Hierarchies in Belief-Closed Type Spaces
Recall that an abstract belief-closed type space is a collection T = {T i , π i } i∈N , where
is the belief mapping for player i. For any k ≥ 2, each of player i's type t i ∈ T i generates recursively via the standard method an order-(k-1) belief hierarchy τ
(t i |T )) as follows:
and for 2 ≤ h ≤ k − 1 and for all (θ, t
Here, ψ
−i ] is the probability with which player i believes that the payoffrelevant parameter is θ and the other players' order-(h − 1) belief hierarchies are prescribed by t
for all t
is the belief hierarchy in the universal type space based on Θ that corresponds to player i's type t i ∈ T i . Subsequently, we will suppress T from τ k i and ρ k i to save space whenever there is no danger of confusion.
The Canonical Belief-Closed Type Space of an Order-k Prior
An order-k prior F ∈ ∆(Θ × T k−1 ) uniquely determines a full-support common-prior belief-closed type space,
, where
is the set of types for player i and
By viewing T F as an abstract belief-closed type space, (12) and (13) can be applied to derive players finite-order belief hierarchies τ h i (t 
and for all i.
Proof. By (12), (15) , and (16), for all θ ∈ Θ and for all t
Thus, by (11), ψ 1 i (t (15),
Proceeding now with induction, suppose for all i and 2 ≤ h ≤ k − 1,
Then, by (13)- (16), for all (θ, t
Putting the preceding equations together with consistency (11) shows
Thus, by induction, τ
, the proof is completed.
The Order of a Belief-Closed Type Space
Recall that a belief-closed type space satisfies the common prior assumption if there is a prior P ∈ ∆(Θ × T ) such that for all i and for all t i ∈ T i , marg T i P (t i ) > 0 and
based on Θ. Following Heifetz and Samet (1998), a mapping f = (f 0 , f 1 , · · · , f n ) from Θ × T to Θ × T , with f 0 : Θ → Θ and f i : T i → T i , is a type morphism from T to T if f 0 is the identity mapping and
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n, t i ∈ T i , and E −i ⊆ Θ × T −i . A type morphism between T and T preserves universal types (see Heifetz and Samet, 1998 , for details).
Definition 5
We say that a belief-closed type space
is of order-k for some integer k ≥ 1, if there is a type morphism from T to the canonical type space T
The following theorem establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for a commonprior belief-closed type space to be of order k.
Proof. Consider first the case with k ≥ 2. Suppose that T is of order-k. Then, by Definition 5, there exist a consistent order-k prior F ∈ ∆(Θ × T k−1 ) and a type (15), (16) , and (18),
Since t
for all t i , t i ∈ T i and all i. This establishes the necessity of (19) .
To prove the sufficiency, let P ∈ ∆(Θ × T ) be the common prior for T = (
for (θ, t k−1 ) ∈ Θ × T k−1 , where ρ k is the inverse of τ k as in (14) . Then, since P ∈ ∆(Θ × T ), it follows from (19) and (21) that F ∈ ∆(Θ × T k−1 ). By the construction of τ k i , F is consistent. Finally, by (19) , the mapping f = (f 0 , f 1 , · · · , f n ) with f 0 the identity mapping on Θ and f i (t i ) = τ k i (t i ) for all t i ∈ T i and all i is a type morphism from T to T F .
Consider now the case with k = 1. Then, ∆(Θ × T k−1 ) reduces to ∆(Θ). In this case, the only order-1 belief of each player is the prior F itself. A similar proof as for the previous case establishes the sufficiency and necessity of (19) .
By (19) , all non-redundant types of an order-k type space have different order-(k-
Thus, when the type space is finite, there exists a finite integer k such that any two types of each player can be separated at the (k-1)-th order beliefs or have the same infinite belief hierarchy (i.e. one of them is redundant). Thus, a direct application of Theorem 1 establishes the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Any finite common-prior belief-closed type space is of finite order.
In an order-k type space, the universal hierarchy τ ∞ i (t i ) contains no additional information not already contained in τ k i (t i ). That is, the tails of the belief hierarchies in the type space can be ignored for strategic analysis. The central message of Theorem 1 is that any order-k type space has the canonical representation of an order-k consistent prior as its non-redundant equivalence.
An handy implication of our approach is that convergence of finite-order priors can be handled using topologies of finite product spaces instead of infinite ones. Further discussion along this line is provided after the introduction of finite order projections. Notice that if T is of order-k, then it is also of order-l for all l > k. Naturally, for the sake of minimal complexity of strategically relevant hierarchies, we are only interested in the smallest such number.
Remark 1
In a heterogenous prior type space, the consistency can be applied to the personalized priors. Thus, with heterogeneity, we define the order of an heterogenousprior type space to be the maximum order of the individual priors.
Remark 2 In the private-value case, substituting T k−2 for the term Θ in the statements, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 can be generalized to cover heterogeneous type spaces of arbitrary finite order k ≥ 2. That is, order-(k-1) heterogeneous priors can be embedded in an order-k consistent prior.
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Lipman (2003) shows that given any common-value finite type space and given any order k ≥ 1, there exists a finite common-prior type space such that any k-belief hierarchies of the former can find its matching in the latter. However, the matching of common-prior type space constructed in his analysis is not exactly one-order higher than those of the heterogeneous priors as we do. 7 On the other hand, our tighter embedding result can only be proved for private-value case and that, aside from n = 2, we cannot embed all finite order type spaces.
The following is an example of an order-3 private-value common-prior type space. Complete-information type spaces can be constructed from this example as those priors that assign non-zero probabilities only to the diagonal. This example illustrates that perturbations to complete-information type spaces may easily lead to higher-order type spaces.
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Example 2: Consider a private-value belief-closed type space
In a private-value type space, the payoff environment Θ is the cartesian product of personalized payoff-relevant parameters Θ i for all i. In such a private-value type space, θ i ∈ Θ i becomes part of player i's private information. That is, each type t i also specifies a payoff typeθ i (t i ) for player i as well as a belief typeπ i (t i ). Thus, in the description of the belief hierarchy of player i's type t i , it is also required that player i believe his payoff type isθ i (t i ) with probability 1:
, ∀h.
A private-value type space is customarily summarized as T = {T i ,θ i ,π i } i∈N and with private-value environment Θ = Π n i=1 Θ i , the spaces of finite-order belief hierarchies are recursively constructed as:
With these in place, concepts and results for common-value cases can be established in a parallel fashion for private-value cases.
7 For example, in his illustration of matching belief hierarchies of order k, the common-prior type space is constructed by adding 2 k copies of the players' types of the original type space. This increases the order of the type space by more than one order (Lipman, 2003 (Lipman, , p. 1259 ). An important implication of Lipman's (2003) results is that finite common-prior type spaces are dense in the universal space. Note that in general it is not easy to translate results obtained in partitions models into type space models, and vice versa. 8 Unfamiliar users of belief-closed type spaces may make the mistake to take the abstract symbols for types as having fixed meanings while manipulating the priors. This is avoided in our consistent-prior approach as we only track the "belief-relevant meaning" instead of the abstract symbols. andπ i is given by a common prior over T 1 × T 2 in the following 
Order-k Projection Type Spaces and Imperfect Nature
For any k ≥ 2, the mappings τ k (·) in (12) and (13) can be applied to project a belief-closed type space
with common prior P to T k−1 as follows. Let
be the set of player i's projection types. SetF
for (θ,
for (θ, t
. It follows from (22) and (23) 
,π k i } i∈N is itself a belief-closed type space of order-k with common priorF k . We refer toT k as the order-k projection of T .
With these notations in place, an iterated application of the mappings τ h establishes the following result.
Lemma 2 Let T be a belief-closed type space. Then, τ k (τ h (t)) = τ k (t) for all type profile t ∈ T and h ≥ k ≥ 2.
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With our characterization of order-k type spaces, projections of orders h > k do not carry more information than order-k projection. That is, as a corollary of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, we have 9 To derive the order-(k-1) belief hierarchy profile τ k (τ h (t)), we view τ h (t) as an abstract type profile with the order-h projection prior. Corollary 3 Let T be an order-k type space. Then, for all h > k and t h−1 ∈T h−1 ,
Suppose that it is common knowledge that the true model of information structure is captured by the type space T , which cerebrally can be of infinite order. One way to model bounded rationality is perhaps to have an "imperfect nature", which draws a combination (θ, t) and informs the players of their corresponding beliefs of some (randomly determined) finite order-k instead of the entire belief hierarchies. Our orderk consistent prior approach reflects realization of such imperfect nature.
Note thatT k converges to T in the weak product topology. A natural question is whether the BNEs of a game with the projection type spaces converge to those of the original one as the order k approaches to infinity. Rubinstein's (1989) email game shows that this is not the case in general. However, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007b) showed that under a global stability condition, which implies dominance solvability of the game, the sensitivity of BNEs with respect to variations of higher order beliefs vanishes as the order of beliefs approaching to infinity. Incorporating their arguments into our framework of projection type spaces, this condition ensures convergence of BNEs with the projection type spaces to those with the original type space. We omit a formal discussion here to avoid complexity of too many new definitions. But, we illustrate the convergence with the following example taken from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007b).
Example 3: Consider a Cournot duopoly with the demand function p(Q) = θ − Q, where θ ∈ Θ is an unknown demand parameter. Assuming zero production costs, firm i's profit at quantities q i , q j and parameter θ is given by
Let T = {T i , π i } i∈N denote a type space with common prior P based on Θ. A strategy profile (q * 1 , q * 2 ) with q * i : T i → A,where A is a compact action space of real numbers, is a BNE if for each type t i , q *
. This yields the following first-order condition:
For a random variable X with appropriate measurability, let 
Total Variation Norm, Solution continuity, and Robustness
Continuity of solution with varying type spaces has been a focus of recent research in the literature. For the interim correlated rationalizability, Chen et al (2009) showed that continuity is always preserved for uniform weak convergence. Given any finite integer k ≥ 1, uniform weak convergence is equivalent to weak convergence in T k .
However, as we illustrate in the next section, weak convergence may be too weak to guarantee continuity of BNE even for k = 2. We consider a stronger notion of convergence for finite order applications. Recall that the total variation norm of a probability measure on a measurable space (Ω, B) is given by
where the supremum is taken over all partitions {Ω m } m of Ω into measurable subsets Ω m ∈ B. Given two measures P and Q on (Ω, B), the total variation distance between them is given by
The reader is referred to Stokey and Lucas (1989, Section 11.3) for an introduction and applications of this distance in economics. We apply the total variation norm to finite order projections of type spaces.
Definition 6 Let P be a common prior for a belief-closed type space. We call ||P || k = ||F k || T V the order-k total variation norm (henceforth, the TV-k norm) of P , wherẽ
is the order-k projection of P given in (22) .
Observe that, although the common priors P and P of two belief-closed type spaces are not necessarily defined on the same σ-algebra, their order-k projections,
We say that a sequence of priors converges to a prior in TV-k norm if the convergence is in TV-k distance. The next two lemmas establish properties on the convergence of priors in TV-k norm that are useful later. Proof. Suppose not. Then, suppF k \ suppF m,k = ∅ for infinitely many integers m.
Without loss of generality, assume it is true for all m. It follows
Since suppF k is finite in number, the right-hand-side of the preceding inequality is well-defined and positive. Consequently, {P m } m does not converge to P in TV-k norm, which is a contradiction.
If a sequence {P m } m of priors converges to prior P in TV-k norm, then for any γ > 0, there exists an integer m γ such that
Proof. Since P m converges to P k in TV-k norm, for any γ > 0 there exists an integer An equilibrium of a game specifies a type-specific distribution over the action profiles for each type profile. Given an equilibrium, Kajii and Morris (1997) consider the equilibrium action distribution as the average of the type-specific action distributions across all type profiles as specified by the equilibrium (Kajii and Morris, 1997, Definition 2.3, p. 1289). They define a (correlated) Nash equilibrium for a game with complete information to be robust against incomplete perturbations, if for every sequence of elaborations there is a sequence of BNEs whose equilibrium action distributions converge to the Nash equilibrium action distributions (Kajii and Morris, 1997, Definitions 2.4, 2.5, p. 1289).
It turns out that if a sequence of type spaces converges in TV-2 norm, then it qualifies as a sequence of elaborations in the sense of Kajii and Morris, while convergence in their sense implies convergence in TV-1 norm. Below we extend the robustness notion of Kajii and Morris (1997) to general Bayesian games based on the TV-k norm. First, given a strategy profile σ for a game with type space T = {T i , π i } n i=1 and common prior P , we useσ k to denote the order-k projection of σ given bỹ
) = ∅ and for all i.
be a type space with common prior P and C a collection of common-prior type spaces with T ∈ C. Let Γ = {{A i , u i } n i=1 , T } be a Bayesian game. We say that a BNE σ * for Γ is C-strong-k robust if for any sequence of type spaces T m ∈ C with common prior P m converging to P in TV-k norm, there is a sequence of BNEs σ
where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm on A andF m,k the order-k projection of P m .
In the preceding definition, the closeness between a BNE of the target prior and that of a perturbed prior is measured by the average of the type-specific Euclidean distances between the order-k projections of these two equilibrium strategies, with the average taken with respect to projections of the perturbed priors. By Lemmas 3 and 4, the support of each perturbed prior is larger than that of the target under the TV-k norm convergence, but the difference vanishes as the perturbation reduces. Thus, weighting the type-specific distance by the perturbed priors is appropriate. In comparison, Kajii and Morris (1997) measure the closeness by the distance in the max norm between the equilibrium action distributions of the equilibrium strategies. For non-degenerate incomplete information games, however, two different strategy profiles may specify the same action distribution. Thus, the limit of a sequence under their convergence may be consistent with a class of strategy profiles, many of which are not BNEs. Of course, in the degenerate case of complete information, such limit leads to a unique strategy profile as there is only type for each player.
Given a Bayesian game Γ with an order-k non-redundant type space T , it follows from (19) and (24) that for any strategy profile for Γ,
Consequently, σ is a BNE for Γ if and only ifσ h is a BNE forΓ
Definition 8
We say that type space T = {T i , π i } i∈N is self-closed in another type
The self-closedness of type space T in T means that the players' beliefs are preserved as their type sets are enlarged. Thus, an implication of the self-closedness is that, fixing the players' action sets, any BNE with type space T remains to be a component of a BNE as the players' type sets are enlarged. This allows us to expand a BNE from a smaller type space to a BNE for a larger one, as shown in the following lemma.
is another type space such that T is self-closed in T . Then, there is a BNE σ
Proof. For i ∈ N and t i ∈ T i , set
and for
where
By construction,BR together withX satisfies all the conditions for Kakutani's fixed point theorem. Thus,BR has a fixed point which we denote byσ
On the other hand, by the self-closedness and the assumption that σ * is a BNE for Γ, σ * (t i ) is also a best response against σ −i for t i ∈ T i .
We now apply Lemma 5 to establish the robustness of BNEs.
be an order-k non-redundant type space with common
, T } be a Bayesian game. Then, all BNEs for Γ are C-strong-(k+1) robust for any collection C of order-k common-prior type spaces.
Proof. Let σ * be a BNE for Γ. Let {P m } m ⊆ C be a sequence of common priors converging to P in TV-(k+1) norm. By Lemma 3, we may assume that for all m,
where suppF k+1 andF m,k+1 are the order-(k+1) projections of P and P m , respectively.
Since both T and T m are of order k, it follows from Theorem 1 thatF k+1 andF m,k+1
are also of order k. Now putting the consistency together with (25), we havẽ 
whereF k andF m,k are the order-k projections P and P m , respectively. This shows
Since T is non-redundant and of order-k, ρ
Now set σ * m = σ * m,k (τ k (t)) for t ∈ T m . Then, since T m is of order-k and σ * m,k is a BNE forΓ m,k , σ * m is a BNE for Γ m andσ * m,k = σ * m,k . By (26) ,
This completes the proof.
A special interesting case is that of complete information.
Corollary 4 Every Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is C-strong-3
robust for any collection C of order-2 common-prior type spaces.
Theorem 2 offers an interesting extension of the result by Monderer and Samet (1989) that all NEs for a complete-information game are robust, if some common-1 belief condition is satisfied. 10 It also implies that a genuine selection among BNEs with the robustness approach is only possible if the required strong convergence is weaker than full-order. Another potential source for genuine selection is by allowing for higher-order perturbations under TV norm convergence. Because of non-trivial merging of higher-order types, best responses based on lower-order projections are not necessarily best responses in the original game, making a similar construction as in Theorem 2 impossible.
Applications
Generic Failure of Coase Cojecture with Order-2 Consistent Priors
Consider an one-sided repeated offers bargaining game between the buyer and seller of an indivisible good. At every period the seller makes an offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. There is a common discount factor. One-sided private information with common knowledge of positive gains from trade is known to yield no delay for this simple bargaining procedure, when the information structure is modeled by a naive type space. Here, delay means that as offers are increasingly frequent, the actual time for reaching agreement does not goe to zero (see Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) ). This convergence is known as the Coase conjecture or property. The underlying information structures are naive private-value type spaces, or order-1 private-value consistent priors.
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Recently, Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) showed that introducing higher-order uncertainty dramatically changes the outcomes. Specifically, the presence of the buyer's (second-order) uncertainties about seller's (first-order) beliefs can lead to the failure of the Coase property, if the seller is considered by the buyer to entertain a certainty belief. Below we demonstrate that the information structures used in their paper can be modeled as order-2 consistent priors.
In their setting, the buyer's value for the indivisible good is either θ 1 = θ 1h or θ 1l with θ 1h > θ 1l > 0, but the value of the good to the seller is θ 2 = 0. The buyer's private information is his value of the good. Though the seller's value is commonly known, he has as private information two order-1 beliefs, φ 
). 12 Consequently, the buyer's types can be identified by his payoff types θ 1h and θ 1l of the good, while the seller's are by his two order-1 beliefs. With these notation, the information structure (6) in their paper, which we denote by F 6 , is the same as F λ in Example 1 with
Feinberg and Skrzypacz also consider an information structure, in which the seller has an informed type, in the sense that he is sure that the buyer has the high value. This is information structure (1) in their paper modeled as having p A h = 1, which we denote by F 1 . It is the same as F λ with
Feinberg and Skrzypacz show that, imposing the intuitive criterion, the Coase property
11 See Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) for further discussions of models based on naive type spaces for studying the Coase property.
12 These two probabilities are denoted by α 0 and α N with α N < α 0 in Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) .
is valid with information structure F 6 , but fails with F 1 in that delay in reaching agreement occurs with positive probability.
We say that an order-2 prior F has "certainty belief" for player i if there is a pair (θ, φ i ) ∈ supp marg Θ×∆(Θ −i ) F such that φ i = δ θ −i . It can be verified that a convex combination of consistent priors is "free of certainty belief types" if and only if both priors are free of certainty belief types. Thus, following Heifetz and Neeman (2006) , having a certainty belief may be regarded as a generic property. 13 On the other hand, Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) state in their conclusion that delay occurs with an order-2 consistent prior based on their chosen private-value payoff environment if and only if the prior has a certainty belief type for the seller. It follows that the Coase property fails genericly with respect to order-2 consistent priors. This provides an answer to the question, asked at the end of their paper, of whether delay is generic in a general type space. Note that, by (27) and (28),
Thus with respect to the weak topology, the Coase property is discontinuous in consistent priors. However, considering that F 1 is generic while F 6 is not, within order-2 consistent priors, this discontinuity indicates that weak convergence is too weak. On the other hand, for F λ to converge in total-variation norm to a common prior with certainty belief, say, F 1 , it is necessary that suppF 1 ⊂ suppF λ for λ close to the number in (28) , as shown in Lemma 3. Hence, 
The Type Spaces of Global Games Are Order 2
Perturbations of a complete information type space associated with a game can result in an equilibrium selection as forcefully demonstrated by Carlsson and van Damme 13 By our Proposition 1, the family of consistent order-2 priors is a convex family. Since a convex combination of two priors is free of certainty beliefs for a player if and only if both of these two priors are free of certain beliefs for the player, it follows that the subset of consistent order-2 priors free of certainty beliefs for a player is contained in a proper face of the family of all consistent order-2 priors. In this geometric sense, the subset of consistent order-2 priors free of certainty beliefs (resp. containing a certainty belief) for a player is regarded non-generic (resp. generic) as in Heifetz and Neeman (2006) .
(1993).
14 They consider a class of perturbations of the following form:
where θ is the payoff-relevant parameter, > 0 is a constant, and η 1 and η 2 are independent random variables. From (29) , it follows that as approaches to zero, x i converges to θ, meaning that information about θ is complete in the limit. Since η 1 and η 2 are independent and θ is constant, so are x 1 and x 2 . Consequently, the distributions of x 1 and x 2 are the marginal distributions of a common prior for (θ, x 1 , x 2 ). In addition, the posterior distribution of θ given x i is uniquely identifiable. Equivalently, player i's order-1 beliefs are completely separable. Thus, given > 0, a similar reasoning as in the proof of our Theorem 1 shows that the corresponding incomplete-information type spaces as implied by (29) are of order 2. Carlsson and van Damme show that in the stag-hunt game only the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium is robust against this class of perturbations. Morris and Shin (2000) consider the same form of perturbations as (29) , except that they assume that θ itself is also uncertain. A specification of their perturbations as in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) requires that θ, η 1 , η 2 be independently and normally distributed with θ ∼ N (µ θ , σ 2 θ ) and η i ∼ N (0, 1) for i = 1, 2. The normality and independence together with (29) implies
Furthermore, (θ, x 1 , x 2 ) jointly have a multivariate normal distribution:
1975, p. 269):
(32)
For i = 1, 2, let φ i (x i ) denote the probability measure about θ with density function (32) . Now, define f :
By (32), f is 1-1. Denote by f −1 the inverse of f . Next, set
Then, since f is measurable with the weak topology on ∆( ) and product topology on
By (30)- (34) and the 1-1 property of f , for all
This shows that F is a consistent order-2 prior. Since f is a type isomorphism, P is of order 2 as well. 15 It follows that the type spaces associated with the proto-type models of Global Games are of order 2.
Correlation Devices and Strategic Relevance of Redundancy
Ely and Peski (2006) point out that 'redundancy' may have strong strategic implications. In particular, they show that strategic relevant primitives ought to include information about correlations between beliefs across players not captured in the formulation of the universal type space. Liu (2005 Liu ( , 2009 investigates the relationships between redundant type spaces and their non-reducible forms. His analysis shows that, with respect to BNE, the added redundancy can be interpreted as correlation devices to generate correlated equilibrium with incomplete information.
Our finite-order consistent prior approach is by construction redundancy-free. However, the model can be extended to deal with the issue of "strategic redundancy" in finite-order type spaces. For example, in an order-2 environment, let us enlarge the set of fundamental uncertainty Θ by adding a space S = ΠS i of profiles of private signals s i ∈ S i . Assume nature jointly draws according to common prior 
for all (θ, φ) ∈ Θ × Π n i=1 ∆(Θ). It turns out that such a projection preserves consistency.
Proof. Fix i. For any (θ, φ i ) ∈ Θ × ∆(Θ) and for any ψ i ∈ ∆(Θ × S −i ) with
Thus, exploiting the fact that
The proof is completed by combining the above equation with (36) .
Consequently, the signal-enriched extension of consistent order-2 prior serves as an implicit device to build in (potentially strategically relevant) redundancy into Bayesian games, preserving the same projection image. In what follows we demonstrate, using the basic motivating example in Ely and Peski (2006) and Liu (2009) , that this extension can indeed accommodate correlation of equilibrium strategies not feasible in redundancy-free models.
Assume Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 }, where θ 1 and θ 2 are associated with the payoff matrices in a 2-person game as in Table 2 below. Assume there is a common naive prior with which the probability for having θ 1 is p ≥ 1/2. Then, the type space has one type for each player given by the first-order belief that assigns probability p to θ 1 and 1 − p to θ 2 . It is straightforward to show that the only BNE outcome has each player receive payoff p. Let S 1 = {s D , s U } and 2 ) for s = (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S. By construction, F satisfies consistency (35) . Furthermore, ψ s i i (θ 1 , S −i ) = p for all s i ∈ S i and for all i, implying that the two different types of each player share the same first-order belief about θ ∈ Θ. By the construction of F , it is also straightforward to show that all their higher-order beliefs are identical. In fact, the canonical projection yields the prior with a singleelement support. However, given F , the strategies a 1 = (a 1 (s U ), a 1 (s D ) = (U, D) a 2 = (a 2 (s L ), a 2 (s R ) = (L, R) and constitute a BNE that yields payoff 1 for each player as a result of perfect correlation via private signals s ∈ S. More generally, Liu (2009) shows that given a redundant type space, a"signal-enriched" non-redundant type space can be constructed such that a type morphism between the two exits. Our construction can be considered as a special case of his. 16 
Conclusion
Belief-closed subsets of the universal type space do not necessarily need the whole extent of the associated infinite belief hierarchies for Bayesian game applications. Naive type spaces need only the first order of the belief hierarchies. Complete information type spaces turn out to require exactly the first two orders of the belief hierarchies.
As demonstrated in the present paper, order-2 type spaces seem to possess sufficiently rich structures, in order to fundamentally challenge many stunning theoretical insights gained using naive type spaces. Walking up the order from the ground, we interpreted finite-order projections as imperfect realizations of an infinite order type space and characterize the impact on the solutions of the projected Bayesian games. We also uncovered the embedding relationship between finite-order heterogeneous-prior type spaces and some one-order higher common-prior ones.
The finite-order approach introduced here also sheds lights on the recent discussion of strategic topology. Restricted to order-k type spaces, uniform-weak, strategic, and weak topologies are all equivalent. This suggests that the discussion of critical types by Ely and Peski (2007) necessarily implicates infinite orders. As we observed, discontinuity of NEs already occur in order-2 type spaces both in global games and the model by Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) , strategic topology seems not to have much impact if the solution concept changes from interim correlated rationalizability to BNE.
With the finite-order total-variation norm defined, we offered a new approach to analyzing the robustness of BNE. The initial insight is that all BNEs for a game with an order-k type space is robust against order-k perturbations under the TV-k norm. Allowing for more perturbations by either relaxing the convergence requirement or the order requirement for the perturbed spaces, thus a harder test, may yield meaningful stricter selections.
Appendix: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Embedding Heterogeneous Priors
Proposition 5 Let P = (P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n ) be a profile of naive priors with a common support. Then, P can be embedded in an order-2 prior if and only if there exist a subset F ⊆ Θ × Π 
Proof. Suppose P = (P 1 , · · · , P n ) can be embedded in an order-2 prior F . Set By (37) and (38), the preceding equation equivalent to
Since φ ∈ ∆(Θ −i ) for all i and for all (θ, φ i ) ∈ F i , it follows from (39) that
This together with condition (b) implies
Putting (39)-(41) together, F is a consistent order-2 nature with suppF = F. Hence, by condition (a), P = (P 1 , · · · , P n ) is embedded in F . This concludes the proof of the sufficiency.
